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Abstract: In this paper we have studied the role of biases in making corporate decisions on investing abroad. 
We have formulated four conditions under which a corporate investment decision is least exposed to the 
influence of heuristics. Failing to comply with some conditions of a precise investment performance leads to a 
situation of a high uncertainty and complexity that demands an intuitive thinking from a decision maker and, as 
a result, stimulates using the rules of thumb. Further, we have discussed possible measures for the mitigation 
of the negative influence of heuristics. For an indicative estimation of a degree of biases an ex-ante/ex-post risk 
perception matrix has been proposed. 
The study is supported by the results of a survey made in 2008 and structured interviews taken in the spring 
and the summer of 2013. The survey was carried on among German firms doing business in Russia. Interviews 
covered not only investments to Russia, but also investments of Russian investors in Europe as well as 
transatlantic foreign direct investments made in the last three years.   
1. Introduction 
Referring to heuristics as a reason that a foreign investment is not performing in line with expectations is not 
widely spread in the modern corporate practice. A manager explains it by some external factors beyond his or 
her control rather than by his or her own miscalculations, personal motivation or not consideration of decision 
relevant information. Not mentioning heuristics as a reason can be done by a manager either intentionally (he 
or she made a deliberate cognitive analysis and came to the conclusion that he or she was unreasonably 
optimistic about a foreign market volume) or unintentionally. The latter can be very realistic since heuristics are 
arisen in course of the intuitive thinking automatically. A manager could have been even unaware of them. In 
the companies with well-established procedures the impact of biases on a final investment decision can be 
mitigated through a procedural rationality and an involvement of cross-department teams in the investment 
assessment. On the other hand, accumulated experience can cause managerial overconfidence. If a company is 
successful for a decade in the domestic market, why should it not be that in the foreign market? In start-ups 
and early-stage firms centered around one or several founders using of heuristics can be even more important 
due to absence of proven routines and insufficient experience. Hence, a company of any size can be exposed to 
heuristics. This is crucial that corporate routines are able to track them. To make it possible, importance of 
biases should be recognized by managers themselves.  
In this paper we discuss sources of biases in course of making decisions on investing abroad. We also propose 
an easy tool which can be used by firms to check whether investment decisions have been exposed to 
heuristics.  
2. Review of literature 
Behavioural economics and finance represent the theoretical framework of this paper. Behavioural finance has 
proved to be valuable especially in explaining paradoxes and phenomena on the financial markets (e.g. earnings 
announcement puzzle, underperformance of IPOs) (Brealey, Myers and Allen, 2008). Its application in the area 
of corporate investment decisions is more challenging because of the lack of publicly available information and 
lesser frequency of investment decisions of companies. Nevertheless, over the past decade the topic has gained 
popularity. A lot of papers have focused especially on the impact of the managerial overconfidence and 
managerial optimism on firms investment decisions. The model of Gervais (2009) suggested that managerial 
overconfidence will most often lead to overinvestment. Hackbarth (2009) has shown that biased managers 
choose higher debt levels than rational managers. The phenomena of managerial optimism was extensively 
explored by Heaton (2002) who using a three data - two period model illustrated that optimistic managers will 
sometimes decline a positive NPV investment that must be financed externally or vice versa invest in a negative 
NPV investment. Managerial optimism hence predicts pecking order capital structure preferences for internal 
financing over external funding of investments and stresses the value of financial slack. The biggest challenge 
for the analysis of managerial overconfidence is the construction of a plausible measure (Malmendier & Tate, 
2005). Malmendier and Tate (2004) proposed two ways for its measure (specifically applicable for CEOs):  
• using stock option data as a proxy. In that case CEO is classified as overconfident if “(i) the CEO holds 
his options beyond a theoretically-calibrated benchmark for exercise, or (ii) the CEO holds his options 
even until the last year before expiration, or (iii) the CEO habitually buys stock of his company during 
the first five sample years”; 
• analysing the tone used to portray CEOs in business magazines and newspapers.  
Ben-David, Graham and Harvey (2006) draw overconfidence of American CFOs by asking them to predict one- 
and ten-year market equity returns and also to provide 80% confidence bounds around their estimates. The 
narrowness of the individual probability distributions for the stock market returns is used as a measure for the 
confidence of respondents. Similar to Hackbarth (2009), the authors confirmed that companies managed by 
overconfident individuals maintain higher financial leverage. They documented that individual overconfidence 
is related to both personal characteristics and firm specific factors. Namely managerial overconfidence 
increases with the degree of skills and education but decreases with professional experience (Ben-David, 
Graham and Harvey, 2008).  
In terms of Big Five personality traits neuroticism appears to be the single most dangerous trait for investors 
(Peterson, 2007). Although it seems to be counterintuitive, “emotional stability” is least correlated with 
investment biases. This might be because emotionally stable investors lack critical self-awareness and suffer 
from biases without realizing it. Using a modified Delphi method Shore (2008) considered contribution of the 
nine systematic biases to the failure of high-scale corporate investments. He asked twenty two business 
professionals to read eight cases in which investments failed and express their opinion on what biases were of 
the highest importance. Four biases (conservatism, illusion of control, selective perception, sunk costs) seemed 
to be more common than others. Groupthink and managerial overconfidence were stated in 25% of cases, 
whereas escalation of commitment was not mentioned at all (Shore 2008). 
In (Pinheiro-Alves 2008) the behavioral approach is applied for investigation of heuristics to which managers of 
Portuguese parent firms should have been exposed while making decisions on investing abroad. The author has 
found that in particular anchoring, strategic inconsistency and herding were common among investors. One 
third of investments were located in Portuguese speaking countries (anchoring). Since everyone was moving to 
Brazil and there was a huge stream of news about the attractiveness of the Brazilian market, the strategy ‘not 
to invest’ can be treated as ‘suspicious’ by the market and damages the reputation of managers (herding).   
To sum up, the papers done up to date suggest that heuristics do impact corporate investment decisions. There 
are only few papers devoted to investment decisions on expansion abroad which have likely been even more 
susceptible to systematic mistakes due to their complexity and uncertainty of host country’s business 
environment. 
 
3. Discussion of the framework 
Assume a company A is considering expansion into a foreign market where it has not done business before. 
Business environment of the foreign market is totally predictable. All information which is relevant to 
investment decision making is available and reliable. The company has an internal routine and knows exactly 
what information is relevant for the decision making and how this information should be processed to come up 
with a solution and a way of the implementation of the intended investment. The execution strategy accounts 
for all relevant and available information at the time of the decision making and during its implementation. 
Company’s internal capabilities, resources and routines are expected to be used in the way which is the most 
reasonable under the given business environment of the foreign market. 
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Under such circumstances investment performance should be accurate meaning that an investment’s actual 
outcome is in line with the expected one.  
Therefore, accuracy of investment performance is subject the following conditions: 
i. Existence of an internal routine which is able to recognize what information is relevant for decision 
making and how it should be processed 
ii. Availability and reliability of relevant information 
iii. Predictability of business environment 
iv. Appropriateness of investment execution strategy. 
When and how is investment performance and decision making process affected by personalities of decision 
makers, their traits and hidden motivation? 
For the purposes of our analysis decision makers have following features: 
• he or she is acting according to company's internal routines but also relies on his or her own intuition; 
• his or her personal interests and motivation are aligned with the company's goals (no principal agent 
problem); 
• personal emotions are supposed to have only a very limited effect since any investment decision is 
going through a number of corporate routines, checks and balances that should mitigate possible 
influence of emotions on a final investment decision. Moreover, as Kahneman and Tversky 
documented systematic mistakes are traced to the design of the machinery of cognition rather than to 
the corruption of thought by emotion (Kahneman 2011). 
In the case above a decision maker plays a passive role. If he or she just follows internal company’s procedures 
(which are supposed to be effective), this guarantees procedural rationality and achievement of a planned 
investment return. For example, a non-German company A is going to acquire a stake in a German independent 
gas transport operator. Under the national energy legislation gas transmission operators are overseen by the 
Federal Network Agency (Bundesnetzagentur) that prescribes companies what investments they have to make 
and secures them a steady return on equity. In that case the company A faces a very predictable business 
environment (condition iii). There is only a limited number of relevant factors which need to be appraised. 
Information (ten-year network development plan, transport tariffs) is easily available and reliable (condition ii). 
Considering that such acquisition is worth of hundred millions euros, the company should have had a proven 
internal routine to assess the fair value of the transport operator and elaborate a plan to get things done 
(condition I and iv). Although the deal sounds to be a big one, it is unlikely that the decision making process on 
it is adhered to influence of personality of decision makers, unless they have a specific interest.  
Let us now analyze what happens when personality of a decision maker is getting more important.  
We suggest that the impact of biases is starting to grow if one or several conditions of a precise investment 
performance are not met. Further, we discuss each condition more detailed. 
Internal routine  
Internal routine is appearing as a mix of best practices and company’s experience. In a company a formalized 
routine can take the form of an Investment Manual, which defines a sequence and main tasks of the 
investment process. For example, if someone in a company has an investment idea (investment originator), first 
of all, he or she should prepare an investment application with a preliminary evaluation of its feasibility and 
economic potential with a rough business case. Investment application is considered at the company’s 
Investment Committee. If the idea is qualified, the second round investment application has to be submitted. At 
that stage, a feasibility study should be added by an analysis from all relevant functional departments 
(marketing, communication, risk management) and/or external consultants. Once an investment application is 
finalized, it goes through a company’s approval mechanism (investment committee, risk committee, 
management board, supervisory board, shareholders meeting) for taking a final investment decision. If it has 
been approved, its execution is monitored and documented in an Investment Progress Report. Upon the 
completion of the investment phase an Investment Finalization Report should be prepared and presented to 
the Investment Committee. Apart from formal instructions companies have often automatized templates for 
investment appraisal which are based on a set of assumptions and/or scenario conditions. 
Existence of well-structured routines with a feedback mechanism (Investment Finalization Report, Investment 
Progress Report) along with formalized assessment tools indeed can decrease the influence of decision makers’ 
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personality. Yet it assumes that routines are 'learning' from mistakes over time. This learning can only be 
effective, if mistakes are fairly and timely recognized and being admitted. Just blaming external factors and a 
set of assumptions is not valuable for learning. Referring to changed market conditions is easier than 
acknowledgement of a personal mistake of failing to consider relevant information which was available at the 
time of decision making and could have been used to develop a hedging strategy or a plan of actions for the 
case of the appearance of 'unknown unknowns'.  
For the valuation of foreign investments the same fundamental principles are applied as for domestic 
investments. If an investment is performed outside the eurozone, investment appraisal supposes currency 
conversion. This can be done by explicitly forecasting foreign exchange rates, converting foreign currency cash 
flows, and then discounting at an appropriate home country discount rate (method A) or by incorporating the 
expected rate of change in exchange rate in the discount rate when discounting foreign currency cash flows 
(method B) (Note on Cross Border Valuation 1997). 
How should country risks be factored into the investment assessment? It is not advisable to adjust a discount 
rate by adding a premium risk as it can introduce mistakes and rather distort than clarify the true value. 
Scenario technique is a better approach. If scenario probabilities are given, it is possible to forecast average 
cash flows and then to discount them at an investment cost of capital. In our article (Kotov, 2009) we were 
trying to find out, how German firms performing investment in Russia allows for political, regulatory and 
country risks. Investors were asked about the following measures: 
• CPI – Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index ranks countries in terms of the 
degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians. It is a 
composite index, a poll of polls, drawing on corruption-related data from expert and business 
surveys carried out by a variety of independent and reputable institutions; 
• CRS – Economic Intelligence Unit Country Risk Service measures political, economic policy and 
economic structure risks as well as currency, sovereign debt and banking sector. It is designed for 
commercial bankers, institutional investors and corporate executives who invest in both emerging 
and developed markets; 
• KKM - World Bank Kaufmann-Kraay-Mastruzzi Worldwide Governance Indicator measures the 
quality of governance and captures six key dimensions of governance (Voice & Accountability, 
Political Stability and Lack of Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, 
and Control of Corruption) for the period between 1996 and present. It is based on approximately 
40 data sources produced by over 30 organizations worldwide. 
Our underlying assumption was that investment climate indicators might affect a  ‘foreign risk premium’. As 
proposed by Dymsza (1972), investors might construct a composite risk factor reflecting country's 
investment climate risks based on uncertainty of cash flows and then use this factor to discount forecast cash 
flows. The survey states that only one of six firms (16%) consider investment climate indicators when they 
appraise investment; more than a half of firms is not familiar with them at all. This result may be due to the 
fact that firms are not aware of the logic behind these indices. In other words, how can the value ‘four’ of CPI 
Index ranging from ‘one’ to ‘ten’ be interpreted in terms of the ‘foreign risk premium’ or incremental cash 
outflows? What does the increase in the CPI from to ‘four’ to ‘five’ mean? Should the discount rate be 
decreased accordingly? There is no commonly recognized solution for this. It is likely that political and 
regulatory risks are accounted for intuitively by decision makers. An example is the valuation of a country risk 
indicator, such as CPI, which is nominally the same for all decisions makers. Its interpretation depends on 
the experience of an individual decision maker. What one decision maker, who is familiar with the country 
and its specific business practices and language, perceives as a moderate level of corruption, might be 
evaluated as a ‘very high’ by another (van de Laar & de Neuboorg, 2006).  
Availability and reliability of relevant information 
Even if using a company's internal routine decision relevant factors have been identified, information on them 
may be available to a limited extent or not measured reliably. For a company evaluating an investment in the 
construction of an underground gas storage abroad, summer/winter spreads (calendar spread between the 
price of natural gas in summer and winter) represent a key variable on which future cash flows are based and 
an investment decision depends. In liberalized gas markets summer/winter spreads are available for a midterm 
period. But how reliable are market values? Can they be relied upon? In the Notes on Cross Border Valuation of 
Harvard Business School it is said that it is generally better to take advantage of market based prices rather 
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than allow value to be built upon subjective guesses. Moreover, market prices are easier to get, if there is a 
liquid market. Yet market prices are not necessary equal to fair values.  
Predictability of business environment 
Uncertainty is a classical source of heuristics. There are a lot of techniques which can be used to deal with 
uncertainty (e.g. Monte Carlo simulation, scenario analysis). Uncertainty should be recognized by a decision 
maker and not getting lost during the evaluation of an investment. Application of scenario and statistical 
analysis, probabilities and means should not create the feeling of 'extra certainty'. If some variables of the 
business environment are fundamentally unpredictable, the company's internal routine should be capable of 
discovering uncertain factors and pushing them through a company's decision making mechanism and 
corporate governance structure. Only by having recognized uncertainty decision makers are able to take 
measures and elaborate risk mitigation strategies. Our survey shows that it is not always the case that a 
company has a 'plan B', even if a rate of success of a foreign investment is estimated at 70% (normalcy bias, 
neglect of probability bias).  
A smooth transfer of information on uncertain variables related to the foreign country's business environment 
towards the company's management assumes that decision makers know how to process it. It makes little 
sense to have sophisticated risk management techniques in place and calculate Value-at-Risk at 97,5% if a 2,5% 
probability of occurrence of losses is anyway neglected as being too low (neglect of probability bias). Or if 
company applies Monte Carlo simulation, a decision maker should not be confused about getting a probability 
distribution for investment's net present value and not just a single figure. Processing of such complex 
information could be tricky and causes using the rules of thumb and/or intuition of decision makers. Intuition is 
a form of the so called fast thinking or system I which operates automatically and can not be turned off at will 
(Kahneman 2011). It had not been a problem, should it have not been susceptible to systematic mistakes. To 
overcome the effects of biases the company's internal routine should secure intuitive solutions to be double 
checked and analyzed during their execution.  
It is worth to mention that uncertainty is not necessary a bad news. For commodity traders market volatility is a 
key success factor. The more volatile is a market, the higher expected return can be gained (or lost). 
Uncertainty has a value and can be assessed, for example, by means of real options. In our survey of 2009 
(Kotov) two thirds of German investors to Russia mentioned a strategic importance of the Russian market as 
the reason for the market entrance. In terms of the real option theory it means that German investors directly 
or indirectly took into account a value of follow up investment opportunities which would have been otherwise 
lost, had they decided not to expand. 
Simplifying investment decision making process by relying on heuristics is not the only possible option for 
dealing with unpredictable environment. As mentioned before, the feeling of certainty can be created through 
the introduction of assumptions. By introducing assumptions one can decrease a level of perceived uncertainty 
and formalize the task in a way that makes slow thinking or functioning of System II possible. If assumptions 
have been made, managers involved in decision making should be aware of them. Otherwise, unreasonable 
simplification of the host country's business environment can be counterproductive. Assumptions are a very 
powerful tool in delivering results which seem to be certain and reliable. However, they should not mislead 
decision makers. Being not able to forecast natural gas prices reliably, one assumes that prices remain the same 
starting from the fourth year of the planning period. This may be a valid assumption. Still it remains a 
simplification.  
Appropriateness of investment execution strategy 
A Russian company with a considerable experience of operating in foreign markets entered a German retail 
market. It had proven business procedures and thought it had competences required to complete a successful 
integration and expand further. A business case was approved internally by its Board of Directors and checked 
by functional departments of a parent company which was more familiar with the German market through its 
affiliated companies. At the time of decision making the company could have been aware of key factors and 
measure them reliably (condition (i) and (ii)). Although the market was volatile, this was a sort of volatility 
which the company should have been used to (condition (iii)). Everything looked fine, until it came to rolling 
out. Our internal analysis has shown that the company should have overestimated its capabilities and 
transferability of its own business processes to the foreign entity. Client relationship management was in 
trouble. Simple business processes like invoicing, hot-line and customer care were running improperly. 
Customers began increasingly complaining. Management had to downgrade forecasts. It took over a year, until 
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management could have taken the situation under control. As seen from this example, the execution strategy is 
in particular susceptible to such bias as planning fallacy, normalcy, illusion of control, managerial 
overconfidence.    
Table 1 summarizes a couple of heuristics which come to play when some conditions of a precise investment 
performance are relaxed.  
Bias Description Condition 
Available data Data collection process is restricted to data 
that is readily or conveniently available  
I, II 
Anchoring Reliance on a past reference or specific piece 
of information 
I, II 
Escalation of commitment The phenomenon where people justify 
increased investment in a decision, based on 
the cumulative prior investment, despite new 
evidence suggesting that the decision was 
probably wrong 
IV 
Negativity Paying more attention and assigning more 
weight to negative than positive experiences  
II 
Planning fallacy The tendency to underestimate task-
completion times 
I, IV 
Normalcy Refusal of planning or reacting for a disaster 
which has never happened before 
I, IV 
Optimism The tendency to be over-optimistic about the 
outcome of planned actions 
II, III 
Illusion of Control The tendency to overestimate one's degree of 
influence over other external events 
III, IV 
Neglect of probability The tendency to completely disregard 
probability when making a decision under 
uncertainty 
III 
Overconfidence Level of expressed confidence that is 
unsupported by the evidence 
IV 
Sunk cost fallacy Unwillingness to surrender the current course 
of activity even if the costs are unrecoverable 
IV 
Table 1. Heuristics and conditions of a precise investment performance 
 
4. How biases can be captured? 
If in the course of investment execution something goes wrong or not according to the plan, it can be caused by 
the following reasons: 
• some relevant information, which has been available at the time of the decision making, is omitted or 
processed improperly. The internal routine has partly failed; 
• investment execution strategy itself was not properly thought through; 
• after an investment decision has been made, a new relevant information appeared. 
The first two reasons can relate both to the impact of biases and to some other factors which have nothing to 
do with them. For instance, omission of relevant information can be a result of (i) an ill internal routine 
(inaccurate market research, poor due diligence and so on) or (ii) illusion of control or similar-to-me effect of 
decision makers. Our survey made in the year of 2008 among German companies investing in Russia has shown 
that a lot of German firms think that both business cultures are much closer to each other as they are in reality 
(similar-to-me effect). Poor investment execution strategy is often caused by managerial overconfidence, 
planning fallacy or escalation of commitment to a failing course of action. A good example from the merger & 
acquisitions transactions is a shaky post-merger implementation plan of actions. In particular struggling to 
integrate a buyer and a seller quite often causes failure of cross-border investments. This is why one of the 
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leading German strategic consultants pays a particular attention to the cultural integration in case of 
international M&As. Although appearance of new information which has not existed at the time of decision 
making is a non-bias related reason, it might cause conservatism or a failure to consider new information. In the 
end, investment execution plan remained unaltered.  
In terms of source of origin investment performance distortions caused by biases or non-bias related reasons 
can be attributed to the host country's external environment or to the company's internal business processes 
and resources. For instance, despite information on Russian rivals had been available and reliable at the time of 
making an investment decision, a leading American retailer failed to estimate properly the level of market 
competition in Russia and finally had to interrupt its expansion. 
Through the perspective of the sources of origin the role of biases can be traced by comparing of: 
i. an impact which host country's external environment and company's internal business processes and 
resources have had on investment performance and  
ii. an impact which host country's external environment and company's internal business processes and 
resources were expected to have at the time of the investment assessment.  
It is necessary to note that comparing of ex-ante and ex-post values is again exposed to some heuristics such as 
hindsight bias (“I-knew-it-all-along” or seeing past events as being predictable) and outcome bias (judging an 
investment decision based on its actual outcome rather than based on the quality of the decision at the time it 
was made). 
There are two main groups of factors. The first group (Macro) is related to the macroeconomical and 
institutional environment of a host country; the second one (Micro) - to the microeconomical environment and 
company’s internal capabilities. If a factor impact is measured on a scale from zero (no) to five (very high) and 
X-axe stands for an actual impact (ex-ante) and Y-axe – for an expected impact (ex-post), then an ex-ante/ex-
post risk perception matrix can be drawn. If a factor is plotted on a line crossing the origin of coordinates at 45⁰ 
to the X-axe, its impact is in the line with expectations. If a factor locates above the line, its impact has been 
undervalued and vice versa. A sum of quadrats of deviations divided by 300 can be used as a proxy of a degree 
of biases. This ratio can take values from 0 (zero) to 1 (one). It can be calculated separately in relation to the 
Macro and Micro factors. 
Two examples below illustrate the ex-ante/ex-post risk perception matrix in action.  
Example 1. 
A Swiss tourist company expanded its operations to Russia. An investment had been assessed through a 
specially designed procedure. The company was optimistic about the Russian market and did not have a Plan B. 
Following a corporate routine the investment was approved by all company’s governing bodies: investment 
committee, risk committee, supervisory board and general meeting of shareholders. Our analysis has shown 
that company’s concerns about the Russian bureaucracy and corruption have not been met. The 
macroeconomic stability was not a problem at all. The hurdles came from an inaccurate analysis of company’s 
internal capabilities to execute an expansion strategy as well as from underestimation of competitors. As a 
consequence, sales did not reach planned figures, whereas worse performance of internal processes 
contributed to unforeseen expenses. The investment performance fell short of expectations by more than 50%. 
After some period the company decided to step back. Although at the time of decision making the company 
was exposed to some biases like optimism and normalcy, closing loss generating operations demonstrates that 
at this stage the company did not experience the escalation of commitment or sunk costs bias. 
Ratio of degree of biases = 0.12 
Ratio of degree of biases for Macro factors = 0.25  
Ratio of degree of biases for Micro factors = 0.03.  
 
 7 
 
Graph 1. Analysis of an investment to Russia by a Swiss firm 
Example 2. An Australian company from the mining industry has acquired a controlling share in an African 
company in a country where it had had no operations before. At the time of decision making the probability of 
success was estimated at 20% only. The company developed a Plan B for the case of an investment failure. The 
investment assessment process followed a company's standard procedure. The investment was approved by 
the company's management board. From the ex-ante/ex-post risk perception matrix on graph 2 it can be seen 
that the company overstated all decision relevant risk factors except for the dependency on suppliers 
(negativity bias). In particular, regulatory and political framework turned out to be not as disruptive as they 
were assessed before the investment took place. In the end, in spite of a negative influence caused by 
unreliable suppliers (the most important reason for higher-than-planned expenses) the African investment 
performed significantly over expectations better (by more than 25%).  
Ratio of degree of biases = 0.18 
Ratio of degree of biases for Macro factors = 0.25  
Ratio of degree of biases for Micro factors = 0.13.  
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Graph 2. Analysis of an investment to an African country by an Australian firm 
 
5. Conclusions 
In the paper we have formulated conditions of a precise investment performance under which a decision on 
investing abroad is least exposed to an influence of heuristics. These are: (i) existence of an internal routine 
which is able to recognize what information is relevant for decision making and how it should be processed; (ii) 
availability and reliability of relevant information; (iii) predictability of business environment; (iv) 
appropriateness of investment execution strategy. Heuristics are used automatically by a decision maker, if he 
or she is thinking intuitively in order to solve complex tasks. Usually high complexity and uncertainty are 
inherent to investment decisions on business expansion due to the non-compliance with some conditions of a 
precise investment performance. For this reason such decisions are particularly exposed to heuristics.  
To mitigate an impact of biases a company's internal routine should create a mechanism for checking 
investment decisions to be made for a possible exposure to biases. For instance, this mechanism can foresee 
that an Investment Progress Report and an Investment Finalization Report include a chapter on an impact of 
biases. To trace an influence of heuristics ex-ante/ex-post risk perception matrix can be used. This matrix 
examines an impact which host country's external environment and company's internal business processes and 
resources have had on investment performance against an impact which host country's external environment 
and company's internal business processes and resources were expected to have at the time of the evaluation 
of an investment. 
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